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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is at the forefront of international policy debates and economic
research. In the past few decades, not only has the volume of investments by multinational
corporations (MNCs) grown exponentially, the rate at which it increased has outpaced tradi-
tional international trade ows. Understanding how individual MNCs choose FDI locations
consequently has risen in importance.
While a vast economics literature has been established to examine the determinants of FDI,
the majority of studies have focused on the e¤ect of host-country attributes. The role of MNCs
heterogeneity in explaining FDI location decisions has been underemphasized. Our paper
addresses the latter issue by investigating how rms with varied levels of total factor productivity
(TFP) self-select into di¤erent host countries. Instead of assuming host-country characteristics
exert a homogeneous e¤ect across individual rms, we explore how the e¤ect of market size,
production costs, and trade costs on rmsinvestment decision varies with rm-level TFP.
We rst model rms decision to invest and produce in foreign countries by building on
the work of Helpman et al. (2004). We derive a number of testable predictions at both the
country- and rm-level. First, the model predicts that the pool of multinationals attracted
to each host country varies in productivity. Countries with less attractive attributes exhibit a
higher cuto¤ productivity, leading to a greater proportion of more productive multinationals.
At the disaggregated level, the model suggests that rms with di¤erent TFP levels will di¤er in
their selection of foreign production locations. More e¢ cient rms are more likely than their
less productive counterparts to invest in tougher markets (e.g., markets with a smaller market
demand and higher production costs) where the e¤ect of TFP in raising rmsability to invest
is more pronounced.
We use a rich dataset of French manufacturing multinational rms and their worldwide sub-
sidiaries to examine the self-selection mechanism predicted in the model. The French experience
is particularly interesting since French rms play an increasingly important role in international
FDI outows. According to the World Investment Report (2006), France experienced the worlds
largest increase in outward FDI in 2005 and became the second largest source country with an
annual ow of $115 billion. Secondly, as a large number of French rms turn to foreign nations
as sites of production facilities, the publics concern with the displacement of manufacturing jobs
has grown substantially and played a prominent role in the 2007 French presidential elections.
In our empirical investigation, we proceed by rst examining the cross-country productivity
distribution of French MNCs and then the investment decisions of individual rms. The em-
pirical evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions at both the country- and
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rm-level. First, we nd that countries with less attractive FDI host attributes, including a
smaller market potential, greater production costs, and a lower import tari¤, have both higher
cuto¤ productivities and greater average TFPs. In fact, the productivity distribution of rms
that decide to invest in these markets rst-order stochastically dominate those investing in more
attractive host countries.
At the rm level, we nd while French multinational rms on average tend to invest in
countries with a larger market potential, more productive rms are consistently more likely
than their less e¢ cient counterparts to produce in small-market-potential countries. Similarly,
rms with higher productivity are more likely to invest in countries that exhibit high entry costs
or high xed costs of investment than their less e¢ cient competitors. Host-country tari¤s also
have an asymmetric e¤ect: A lower tari¤ rate discourages less productive rms from investing
in the markets and leads to a larger proportion of e¢ cient multinational rms.
Our paper is closely related to a recently growing literature that examines the decision of
heterogeneous rms to participate in international markets.1 This literature builds on the
pioneering work of Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton et al. (2003), who introduce rm hetero-
geneity to the decision to engage in international trade, and is developed further by Helpman
et al. (2004), who bring foreign direct investment decision into the analysis. By investigating
heterogeneous rmschoice between exporting and FDI, Helpman et al. (2004) show that only
the most productive rms can overcome the plant-level xed cost of investment and become
multinationals. This hypothesis has been tested in several empirical studies including Girma
et al. (2004) and Girma et al. (2005), both of which nd a signicant productivity di¤erential
between multinational and non-multinational rms. One notable exception is Head and Ries
(2003) who show that when the foreign country is small and o¤ers cost advantage, it is possible
that the least productive rms locate abroad whereas more productive ones produce at home.
Three recent studies in this literature, Yeaple (2009), Mayer et al. (2007) and Nefussi (2006),
are particularly relevant to our work. These papers extend Helpman et al. (2004) and examine
heterogeneous rms location choices. Yeaple (2009) uses U.S. MNC data and examines the
role of rm heterogeneity in explaining the structure of U.S. FDI activity in 1994. He shows
that host-country characteristics a¤ect both the scale and scope of foreign investment. Mayer
et al. (2007) contribute to the literature by jointly addressing the decision to invest abroad as
1Our research also builds on the broader theoretical and empirical literature that examines the determinants of
FDI. Classic theoretical work in this area include Markusen (1984), Helpman (1984), and Markusen and Venables
(1998, 2000) who have identied market access and comparative advantage as the two main motives to invest
abroad. A number of empirical studies, including Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001), Blonigen (2002), Yeaple
(2003) and Head and Mayer (2004), examine the theoretical predictions and nd consistent evidence for both
types of investment incentives. Blonigen (2005) provides an excellent survey of the literature.
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well as the FDI location choice and nd that more productive French rms are more likely to
invest abroad. Nefussi (2006) modies the theoretical framework of Helpman et al. (2004) by
allowing for variable price demand elasticity and nds rms with intermediate productivities are
more likely to engage in FDI.
Our paper complements the above studies but di¤ers in important ways. Our focus is on how
productivity di¤erences among MNCs may lead to di¤erential e¤ects of host-country attributes
and consequently distinct choices of foreign production locations. This contrasts with Yeaple
(2009), who focuses on the role of rm productivity in the scale and scope of aggregate FDI and
assumes the e¤ect of host-country characteristics is homogeneous across rms and the e¤ect of
TFP is uniform across countries. The paper also di¤ers from Mayer et al. (2007) who emphasize
the role of TFP in raising rmsability to invest abroad instead of at home. We stress in this
study that the positive e¤ect of TFP on rmsability to invest abroad is more pronounced in
less attractive markets.
Another contribution of the paper is to address the ambiguous causality between rm pro-
ductivity and FDI activity, an issue that has not been considered in the literature. Existing
studies have focused mainly on the productivity di¤erential between multinational and non-
multinational rms and have not taken into account the possibility that TFP can be both a
cause and an e¤ect of the investment decision.2 We take two steps to disentangle the causal
e¤ect. First, we estimate multinational rms productivity based on their past production
performance at home. The use of a time and a spatial lag between the measure of TFP and
the location choice reduces the likelihood that productivity is a¤ected by the latter variable.
Second, we employ a two-stage control function approach that is developed by Petrin and Train
(2005, 2006) and subsequently used by studies such as Liu et al. (forthcoming). Specically,
we pair each French MNC with respective reference groups formed by other French national or
multinational rms in the same industry and same region and use the average productivity of
these reference groups as instrumental variables for individual MNCsproductivity.3 We then
recover unobserved rm heterogeneity based on the rst-stage estimates and include them in
the second-stage estimation. We nd controlling for the unobserved factors does not change
the main ndings of this paper.
Finally, we adopt various procedures to control for unobserved country and rm heterogene-
2The issue of causal e¤ect between productivity and participation in foreign markets has been noted in the
export literature where a number of studies (see, e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004; Clerides et al., 1998) have
been devoted to disentangling the causal e¤ect of productivity and export decision. This literature shows that
the productivity di¤erence between exporters and non-exporters can be both ex ante (i.e., more productive rms
self-select into export markets) and ex post (i.e., exporting raises rm productivity).
3The choice of these instruments is motivated by the large literature on technology spillover and social inter-
action that has suggested the existence of both industry and regional spillovers across rms.
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ity. For example, we use a two-step approach and construct an industry-specic measure of
host-country attractiveness to control for unobserved country characteristics. This approach
allows us to directly examine how heterogeneous rms sort across markets with varied levels of
attractiveness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We rst lay out a model in Section 2 to motivate
our empirical analysis and derive a number of testable hypotheses. We then provide a detailed
description of the data in Section 3 and investigate in Section 4 the productivity distribution
of French MNCs across countries. We report the rm-level empirical results in Section 5 and
sensitivity analyses in Section 6. Last, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Basic setup
In this section, we build on Helpman et al. (2004) and Yeaple (2009) and model multination-
alsdecision to invest in foreign countries. Suppose the world consists of 2 sectors and N + 1
countries. One sector produces a homogeneous product while the other sector produces di¤er-
entiated products. The homogeneous good is the numeraire good and produced in all countries.
The N + 1 countries consist of a home country, denoted as country 0, and N foreign countries
denoted as j = 1; :::; N .
There is a continuum of rms in each country. Each rm produces a di¤erent brand of the
di¤erentiated product and possesses a distinct productivity level . The cumulative distribution
function of rm productivity is denoted as G().
Given a CES utility function, the demand function of each country for the di¤erentiated
product is given by xij = aijAjpij ", where xij is the quantity sold by rm i in country j, aij
is a destination and rm specic demand parameter, Aj the demand level in country j, pij the
price, and "  1=(1   ) > 1 the demand elasticity.4 Following Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2008) and Crozet, Head and Mayer (2009), we include a demand parameter to capture cross-
country variation in, for example, the preference for each rms product or the extent of rms
business network. We assume that aij is distributed with a cumulative distribution function
H(a). As shown in Section 2.3, heterogeneity in the demand parameter allows the model to
accommodate the possibility that two rms with the same productivity, , may di¤er in their
sales in the same country and, moreover, the choice of countries to invest.
4Note given the CES utility function, Aj  Ej=
R
i2Ij aijp
1 "
ij di where Ej measures the total spending of
country j on the di¤erentiated product and Ij the set of available brands in j. As in Yeaple (2008), the model
here is not closed via free entry condition.
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Without loss of generality, we focus on rms in country 0. If rm i in country 0 chooses to
produce and sell at home, it must incur a variable cost of production c0=i, and a xed cost of
production fD0 . Its prot-maximizing strategy is to set p0 = c0= (i), which means that the
prot is given by
Di0 = ai0B0

c0
i
1 "
  fD0 ; (1)
where B0  (1  )" 1A0.
Firm i may also sell to a foreign country j = 1; :::; N . It may either export from home or
produce in the foreign country.5 If rm i chooses to export the product to country j, it must
incur a per-unit iceberg trade cost ij (> 1), which reects both the transport cost and the tari¤
country j imposes on the goods imported from i. The rm must also pay an additional xed
cost fXj , which includes the costs of forming a distribution and servicing network in country j.
Its prot-maximizing strategy is to set pij = ijc0=(i), j = 1 ; :::; N , which yields the export
prot as
Xij = aijBj

c0ij
i
1 "
  fXj ; (2)
where Bj  (1  )" 1Aj .
If rm i chooses instead to serve the foreign market through local production, it must pay a
xed cost f Ij for each foreign market j in which it invests. This includes the costs of operating a
subsidiary as well as the distribution and servicing network costs embodied in fXj , which means
that f Ij > f
X
j and there exist plant-level economies of scale. In this case, the prot rm i
receives from investing and producing in foreign country j is
Iij = aijBj

cj
i
1 "
  f Ij : (3)
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we assume
fD0 < (ij)
" 1fXj <

cj
c0
" 1
f Ij (4)
for all j.
It is clear that rms will serve a foreign country via FDI only if Iij > 
X
ij . Given equations
5Note we assume in the model that rms would only consider exporting to a foreign country from home, and
thus leave out the possibility of exporting from its foreign subsidiaries. In a similar fashion, we assume that
rms would always supply their home country through local production and do not consider the case in which
rms export their products from foreign subsidiaries to home. For theoretical contributions in this area, see, for
example, Motta and Norman (1996), Head and Ries (2003), and Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007). We
do however take into account these possibilities in the empirical analysis by, for example, including a measure of
market potential for each host country to capture the demand in their potential export markets.
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(2) and (3), this condition implies that rm productivity must satisfy, for any given value of a,
i > 
I
j 
"
f Ij   fXj
aBj (cj1 "   (c0ij)1 ")
# 1
" 1
: (5)
Conversely, rms would prefer exporting to FDI if Xij > 
I
ij and 
X
ij > 0, which implies
"
fXj (c0ij)
" 1
aBj
# 1
" 1
 Xj < i < Ij : (6)
Because of the inequality conditions specied in (4), a clear correlation between rm pro-
ductivity and their participation in domestic and foreign markets is established. The least
productive group of rms, i.e., those with i < D0  ( fD0 c0" 1=(B0a))1=(" 1), would not pro-
duce at all. Firms for which D0 < i < 
X
j (8j), will produce and supply only the domestic
market. Relatively more productive rms sell to both the domestic and foreign countries in
which Xj < i but the supply strategy varies with the level of productivity. In a given market
j, rms with an intermediate level of productivity, i.e., Xj < i < 
I
j , will choose to export,
whereas the most productive rms with i > Ij would prefer to produce locally.
In the rest of Section 2, we derive a number of testable predictions based on the outlined
model. First, we examine in Section 2.2 the productivity composition of multinationals across
host countries.6 Then, we investigate di¤erent aspects of rm-level decision, in particular, the
extensive and intensive margins of rm investment activities.
2.2 Cross-country di¤erences in the productivity distribution
First, we obtain the expected cuto¤ productivity ej . Given the distribution function of the
demand parameter (i.e., H(a)), we have
ej =
"
f Ij   fXj
Bj (cj1 "   (c0ij)1 ")
# 1
" 1
1 (7)
where 1 
R1
0 a
 1=(" 1)dH(a) . Taking natural logs of the above equation yields:7
lnej = 1"  1   lnBj   ln  cj1 "   (c0ij)1 "+ ln   f Ij   fXj + ln1 : (8)
6Similar to Yeaple (2008), we also examined the intensive and extensive margins of aggregate FDI. The
theoretical and empirical results are reported in the Appendix A of an earlier working paper version (Chen and
Moore, 2008).
7 In the rest of Section 2, we focus on the cuto¤productivity to engage in FDI and hence suppress the superscript
of j .
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This equation shows that the entry threshold productivity is a decreasing function of market
"attractiveness". Countries with a greater demand for the di¤erentiated good (Bj) have a lower
cuto¤ productivity. Countries with a larger variable cost of production (cj) or a larger xed
cost of investment ( f Ij ) have higher entry thresholds. A greater trade cost (ij) raises rms
incentive to choose FDI instead of exporting reducing the minimum productivity required for
rms to invest in the market.
Now consider the conditional expected productivity of multinationals that choose to enter a
given country. This will be
ej  E jIij > Xij  =
R1
0
R1
j
dG()dH(a)
Pr

Iij > 
X
ij
 ; (9)
where Pr(Iij > 
X
ij ) represents rm is probability of investing in country j. We follow the
literature and assume that rm productivity follows a pareto distribution, i.e., G() = 1 (b=)k,
where b is the minimum productivity of the industry in country 0 and k is the shape parameter.
Given (5), this assumption implies that
ej = " f Ij   fXj
Bj (cj1 "   (c0ij)1 ")
# 1
" 1 k
k   1(2=3); (10)
where 2 
R1
0 a
(k 1)=(" 1)dH(a) and 3 
R1
0 a
k=(" 1)dH(a) . The above equation can be
transformed to
ln ej = 1
"  1
  lnBj   ln  cj1 "   (c0ij)1 "+ ln   f Ij   fXj + ln kk   1

+ ln (2=3) :
(11)
Similar to ej , the conditional expected productivity ej is higher in less attractive markets. In
Section 5, we estimate equations (8) and (11) and examine how our hypotheses hold in the data.
Note these two attributes of productivity distribution, i.e., ej and ej , can also be expressed
in terms of the number of rms that choose to invest in the country (i.e., Nj). This is because
in a su¢ ciently large sample, Nj=N (where N is the total number of rms in country 0) proxies
Pr(Iij > 
X
ij ). Given the pareto distribution assumption, this implies
ej  (Nj) 1=k bkN31=k (12)
and ej  (Nj) 1=k bkN31=k k
k   1
2
13
: (13)
8
Now consider the productivity distribution as a whole. The properties of ej and ej discussed
above also lead to testable hypothesis on the cumulative distribution of MNC productivities
across host countries. That is, the productivity distribution of rms that invest in tougher
markets should rst-order stochastically dominate those that invest in easy markets.
To see this, let j(z) denote the fraction of rms investing in country j with productivity
less than or equal to z. Since only rms whose productivity exceeds j will invest in country j,
j(z) can be expressed as j(z) =
R1
0 Pr(j < i < z)dH(a) =
R1
0
R z
j
dG()dH(a). Given
G() = 1  (b=)k, we obtain
j(z) =
R1
0

 kj b
k    kz bk

dH(a) =
"
Bj
 
cj
1 "   (c0ij)1 "

f Ij   fXj
# k
" 1
bk3    kz bk: (14)
It is clear from the above equation that holding constant z, the fraction of rms investing
in a market, i.e., j(z), always increases in market attractiveness. This suggests that the
productivity distribution of multinationals in countries with a larger market demand, smaller
production costs or a greater trade cost is rst-order stochastically dominated by those that
self-select into relatively less attractive destinations.
2.3 Firm-level decisions
Next, we proceed to investigate rm-level decisions. First, we consider each rms decision to
undertake FDI in a foreign country. Let yij denote an indicator variable that equals to 1 if rm
i decides to invest in country j and 0 otherwise. As discussed in Section 2.1,
yij =
8<: 1 if Iij > Xij0 if Iij  Xij : (15)
The probability function of yij = 1 is hence given by
Pr (yij = 1) = Pr
8<:i >
"
f Ij   fXj
aijBj (cj1 "   (c0ij)1 ")
# 1
" 1
9=; : (16)
The above equation suggests that how a rms productivity compares to host-country cuto¤
productivity (captured on the right-hand-side of the inequality) determines that rms decision
to invest in the market. At a given aij , an increase in the cuto¤ productivity, resulting from
either a smaller market size (Bj), higher production costs (cj and f Ij ) or a lower trade cost (ij),
reduces rmsprobability to produce in the country. This e¤ect is especially strong for rms
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with relatively lower productivities. These rms will choose not to enter the di¢ cult markets
unless they obtain a su¢ ciently high demand draw (aij). In Section 5, the parameter aij serves
as a structural error term in the regression.
Now assume a rm already decided to invest in a country. The a¢ liate sales this rm will
receive is given by
sij = pijxij =
1
1  aijBjcj
1 "" 1i where i > j : (17)
At a given level of aij , rms with a greater productivity will have more a¢ liate sales. Further-
more, the level of a¢ liate sales increases in host countriesmarket demand but decreases in the
variable cost of production. Similar to equation (16), aij provides a structural error term for
the regression in Section 5.
Finally, we note that the model also derives a testable prediction on the number of foreign
countries in which each multinational rm invests when there is no rm variant idiosyncratic
demand shock. Suppose we can rank countries j = 1; :::; N based on their cuto¤ productivities
such that country 1 is the easiest market of all and country N is the most di¢ cult. Then, it
must be the case that every rm that invests in country j also invests in country k < j, implying
that rms with a greater productivity invest in a larger number of countries. This hierarchy will
not hold, however, when there is su¢ ciently large rm variation in the demand shock.8
3 Data
We employ a dataset of French manufacturing rms to examine the empirical regularities in
multinationalslocation decision. This dataset records the nancial and subsidiary information
of French public and private rms. It is drawn from AMADEUS, a comprehensive database that
contains companies of 38 European countries. The information is collected by providers including
national public bodies in charge of collecting the annual accounts (e.g., Institut National de la
Propriete Industrielle (National Institute for Industrial Property) in the case of France).
The nancial information in the dataset reports each French rms balance and income state-
ments. We use revenue, value added, xed asset, employment, and material cost to estimate
each rms total factor productivity, a primary variable of the paper. In particular, we use
8Another source of deviation from the hierarchy arises from the possibility of export-platform FDI. If the model
allows multinationals to serve other countries from their foreign production locations and assumes a su¢ ciently
large plant-level scale economy, the predicted number of countries in which each rm invests is likely to be smaller.
But because of the di¤erent levels of productivity and varied country characteristics, rms may still self-select
into di¤erent markets. This expectation is consistent with evidence in the empirical section that suggests a
systematic self-selection mechanism in French MNCslocation decision.
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rms unconsolidated nancial data in the period 1993 and 2001 to derive estimates of pro-
duction function and productivity.9 The estimation methodology employed in the paper is the
semiparametric estimator developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).10 Based on this approach,
we estimate the production function for each SIC 3-digit industry and obtain the productivity
for each rm based on the industry-specic production function estimates.
We employ three strategies to establish the causal e¤ect of TFP on multinational rms
location choices. First, we use rmsunconsolidated nancial data and measure TFP solely
based on their production activities at home. Second, we use rmsaverage TFP in the period
of 1997-2001 to explain their decision to invest abroad in a later period.11 Third, we adopt a
control-function approach in Section 6.2 and address the potential endogeneity of TFP. Note we
also use rmsrelative TFP to deal with the cross-industry variation in productivity estimates.
Specically, we regress the TFP estimates (obtained from the production function estimations)
on a group of industry dummies and use the tted residuals as the measure of within-industry
heterogeneity.
The subsidiary section of the dataset lists the location and activities of each French rms
foreign subsidiaries in 2005. As discussed above, the time lag between TFP and choice of
subsidiary locations mitigates possible reverse causality between the two variables. Furthermore,
given the main focus of this paper is to examine rmsdecision of where to invest abroad, we
limited our sample to rms that have at least one subsidiary overseas in 2005.12 This results in
a nal sample of 1302 individual French multinationals, for which both nancial and subsidiary
information are available.
In addition to rm heterogeneity, we take into account a number of host-country character-
istics that have traditionally been used to explain multinationals location choices. First, we
follow Head and Mayer (2004) and Blonigen et al. (2007) and include a measure of market po-
tential to control for the impact of the size of both the domestic and potential export markets on
the MNCschoice of host countries. Specically, we calculate, for each country j, the sum of its
9Value added, material costs, and capital are all deated by their respective deators, taken from the French
National Institute for Statistics and Economics Studies (INSEE).
10Details of the estimation are reported in the Appendix B of Chen and Moore (2008). We also considered a
number of approaches to obtain estimates of TFP, including instrumental variables estimation and semiparametric
estimation. Van Biesebroeck (2008) provides a comprehensive comparison of these methods and nds that they
produce similar productivity estimates. Similar to Van Biesebroeck (2008), we did not nd signicant di¤erences
in the estimates of TFP obtained from either the IV or the semiparametric estimation. We report the results
based on the semiparametric estimator introduced in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
11We also used rmsTFP in 2001 and average TFP in 1999-2001 as alternatives. The results were largely
similar.
12The dropped rms would be needed if we were to compare the productivity of multinationals with other types
of rms. However, since our paper does not focus on this issue but rather on heterogeneous multinational rms
location choice abroad, we only consider existing and new multinational rms. The potential bias in TFP resulted
from sample selection will be addressed in Section 6.2 where we deal with the potential endogeneity of TFP.
11
GDP and GDP of all other countries, each weighed by their distance to j, i.e.,
P
l (1=djl)GDPl,
where djl is the great circle distance between j and ls largest cities taking into account each
countrys internal distance and GDPl is country ls real GDP in 2001 (measured in 2000 U.S.
dollars). We obtain the GDP and distance data from the World Development Indicators and
the CEPII distance database, respectively.13
Second, we control for host countriesmarginal production cost by including real unit labor
cost, where each industry is weighed by its output share. We obtain the labor cost and output
data from the World Bank Trade and Production Database. We also include each rms labor
intensity measured by the labor cost share of value added and interact it with host-country real
unit labor cost to examine whether rms with a higher labor intensity have a greater probability
to invest in low-labor-cost countries. Furthermore, we control for host countriestax policy using
the maximum corporate tax rate, obtained from the U.S. O¢ ce of Tax Policy Research.14
We also consider various measures of xed cost of investment. First, we use the costs of
starting a business, available from the World Development Indicators, as a proxy for entry cost.
Second, we include the distance between France and the host country with the expectation
that subsidiaries located in distant markets are likely to require a larger monitoring cost. A
similar hypothesis applies to countries that are contiguous to France. Third, we include host
countriesgovernance quality as a measure of costs of doing business. Countries with a poorer
governance may require a greater xed cost of investment and are thus less likely to attract
MNC investment. The index of governance quality is the average of three indices: control of
corruption, regulator quality, and government e¤ectiveness, all of which are obtained from the
Polity IV database.
Finally, we control for several aspects of trade costs. We include the distance and contiguity
between a potential host and France and tari¤ rates set by host and home countries as in the
gravity equation literature.15 Specically, we include the tari¤ rate set by a potential host
country on a French rms primary product with the expectation that the higher this tari¤, the
more incentive the French rm will have to produce the product inside the host country.16 We
also use a dummy variable to distinguish EU members from the rest of the world and capture
13We also considered using sectoral outputs as a measure of demand at the industry level. However, the data
of sectoral outputs have many missing values and would reduce our sample size substantially.
14 Ideally, we would like to use the applied corporate tax rate in each host country. But this data consists of a
large number of missing values for the countries in our sample.
15Note distance and contiguity also a¤ect the xed cost of investment, which adversely a¤ects MNCsinvestment
decision. Furthermore, for rms that engage in intra-rm trade between home and host countries, transport cost
can reduce their incentive to produce abroad. As a result, the net e¤ect of distance and contiguity is ambiguous.
16The results were qualitatively similar when we used the average tari¤ rate imposed on the rms primary and
secondary products.
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the other trade cost di¤erences between EU and non-EU destinations.17 Moreover, we include
the tari¤ rate France sets on the host-country exports and expect multinationals that seek to
export their products back to France would be adversely a¤ected by this tari¤. Both French and
host-country tari¤ data are applied tari¤ rates measured at the SIC 3-digit level and obtained
from the WITS database. Note that preferential tari¤s within the EU and those between the
EU and other countries are reected in the data. Table 1 describes the source and summary
statistics of the above variables.18
[Table 1 about here]
4 Cross-country di¤erences in the productivity distribution
We start our empirical investigation by rst examining the cross-country di¤erences in the
productivity distribution. In particular, we take equations (8), (11) and (14) to the data and
compare them with the empirical evidence.
The results of Section 2.2 suggest that countries with more attractive attributes have lower
cuto¤ productivities and consequently lower average productivities. The model also predicts a
negative correlation between host-country cuto¤ (and average) productivity and the number of
multinationals. We rst examine the latter hypothesis by plotting the minimum productivity
of French MNCs in each host country against the number of French MNCs operating in that
market (i.e., host-country popularity). As shown in Figure 1, the entry threshold productivity
is indeed negatively associated with the popularity of the market. We also observe a negative,
albeit less signicant, correlation between average TFP and number of MNCs which suggests
that rms investing in less popular markets are on average more e¢ cient.
[Figure 1 about here]
Now we directly estimate the cuto¤ and average TFPs as a function of host-country char-
acteristics based on equations (8) and (11). Specically, we identify ejk  mini2
jk i andejk Pi2
jki=Njk for each host country j and industry k, where 
jk is the set of French rms
in industry k and investing in j.19 As shown in Table 2, both the cuto¤ and average TFPs
17All countries that joined the EU before 2005 are treated as EU members.
18We also take two measures to address the possibility of omitted host-country characteristics. First, we
use a country xed e¤ect to control for all host-market attributes. Second, we construct an industry-specic
measure of host-country attractiveness in Section 6.3 to capture all the country-industry factors that can a¤ect
multinationalslocation decision.
19Note when estimating the average TFP, the number of MNCs in each host country will be inversely propor-
tionate to the variance of the error term and lead to heteroskedasticity. We therefore adopt generalized least
squares (GLS) estimation where we use the number of MNCs in each host country as the weight.
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are negatively correlated with the host-country market potential.20 This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction that the entry threshold productivity is greater in countries with a smaller
market demand. The cuto¤ productivity is also positively correlated with host-country unit
labor cost, a result that is again consistent with the theory. Specically, a 100-percent increase
in unit labor cost raises the entry threshold by 62 percent. Only the relatively more productive
rms will nd it protable to invest in countries with a larger variable cost of production. This
is similarly true for countries with a greater xed cost of investment, indicated by the positive
parameters of entry cost and distance. The entry threshold productivity is 7 percent higher in
countries where the distance to France is 100 percent greater. Finally, a lower import tari¤ in
host countries also results in a higher cuto¤ productivity for multinational rms as exporting
becomes less costly.21
[Table 2 about here]
Next, we examine the cross-country di¤erences in the distribution of rm productivities
indicated by equation (14). We predict in Section 2.2 that the productivity distribution of rms
that enter tougher markets should rst-order stochastically dominate those that invest in easy
markets. The predicted sorting of multinational rms is supported in the data. Figure 2 shows
that the productivity distribution of rms that invest in countries with above-average market
potential appears to be rst-order stochastically dominated by rms that have subsidiaries in
countries with below-average market potential. Similarly, rms that invest in countries with a
below-average unit labor cost or a below-average xed cost as measured by either the entry cost
(i.e., cost of starting a business) or distance are less productive than other multinational rms.
Figure 3 illustrates the case of entry cost.
[Figures 2-3 about here]
These distribution di¤erences are also statistically signicant. We rst perform a two-sided
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the equality of the two distributions, i.e., 1() = 2(). If
the equality hypothesis is rejected, we then use a one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine
the rst-order stochastic dominance, i.e., 1() 6 2(). If we fail to reject this hypothesis and
20Our hypotheses are summarized in the second column of Table 2 (and all the following tables).
21Note that both the cuto¤ and average productivities are only observed for countries and industries that have
at least one French multinational rm. In other words, they are not observable in countries with prohibitive
cuto¤ productivities, which can give rise to a sample selection issue. We hence also considered using the Heckman
(1979) selection model and proceeding in two stages. First, we estimated the probability of having at least one
French MNC in a host country and a given industry. Then, we estimated the cuto¤ and average productivities,
taking into account the selection bias reected in the inverse mills ratio obtained from the rst stage. We found
the estimated e¤ect of host-country characteristics remains similar.
14
given 1() 6= 2() (obtained from the rst step), we conclude that 1() < 2(), i.e., 2() is
rst-order stochastically dominated by 1().22
We nd that, rst, consistent with the literature there is a signicant productivity di¤er-
ential among domestic, exporting and multinational rms. Not only are multinationals more
productive than the other types of rms, those that invest in multiple host countries also exhibit
a productivity premium compared to an average MNC. Moreover, the cross-country productiv-
ity di¤erential predicted in Section 2.2 is also largely conrmed. The productivity distribution
of rms that invest in tougher markets signicantly dominates the productivity distribution of
those investing in easier markets.
5 Main econometric results
In this section, we directly examine our rm-level hypotheses, i.e., equations (16)-(17), and
investigate individual rmsinvestment decisions. First, we estimate, at individual rm level,
the relationship between productivity and the intensive and extensive margins of investment.23
Then we move to rm-country level and examine the primary question of the paper how rm
and country heterogeneity jointly explain individual French rmsinvestment decisions.
[Table 3 about here]
We nd in Table 3 that TFP is positively correlated with rmsaverage a¢ liate sales (i.e.,esi = Pj sij=Mi, where Mi denotes the number of countries in which a rm i invests). This
is consistent with the prediction in Section 2.3: More e¢ cient rms sell more in each country.
Table 3 also indicates a positive relationship between TFP and the number of countries in which
investment occurs (i.e., Mi). This suggests more productive rms enter more host countries
relative to an average MNC.
Now we turn to the central part of the analysis, which is to investigate how rms with varied
levels of productivity di¤er in their foreign production location choice. Based on Section 2.3,
we consider the following baseline equation
Pr (yij = 1) = (+ j + ji + "ij) (18)
where Pr (yij = 1) represents the probability of rm i investing in country j, (:) is the logistic
cumulative distribution function, j represents either Xj (where Xj is a vector of host-country
22This approach has been adopted in the past by, for example, Girma et al. (2004) and Girma et al. (2005) to
compare the productivity of domestic, exporting and multinational rms.
23Because a¢ liate sales data are not available for all subsidiaries, we do not examine the intensive margin at
subsidiary level. We focus instead on rmsaverage a¢ liate sales for which there are fewer missing values.
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characteristics) or a vector of host-country dummies, i denotes rm is relative productivity (in
natural logs) in a lagged period, and j is the e¤ect of productivity across host countries (which
we estimate as either a vector of country dummies or a function of host-country attributes).
The error term "ij captures residuals including the demand parameter from Section 2 (aij).24
We begin with Table 4 where we assume that the e¤ect of TFP is uniform across countries,
i.e., j =  for all j, (and equivalently the e¤ect of host-country attributes is homogeneous
across rms). We nd that both TFP and host-country characteristics exert a signicant e¤ect
on multinationals location decision. First, there is a positive correlation between TFP and
rmsprobability to have foreign subsidiaries. More productive rms are more likely than their
less e¢ cient counterparts to produce in a foreign country. This result is also robust when we
include a country xed e¤ect in the last column of Table 4 (instead of the vector of country
attributes).25
[Table 4 about here]
In terms of the e¤ect of host-country attributes, we nd that rms are more likely to have
subsidiaries in countries with more attractive attributes as expected from the theory. For
example, French rms have a greater probability to invest in countries with a larger market
potential. They also tend to choose countries with a lower unit labor cost as their production
locations, suggesting a signicant comparative advantage motive in their investment decision.
Countries with higher entry cost are less likely to be selected by French MNCs, a result that is
similarly true for countries remote from France and with poor governance. Finally, both host-
and home-country tari¤s exert a signicant e¤ect on French rmslocation choice. Consistent
with the tari¤-jumping motive theory, French MNCs are more likely to produce in countries
24 Inspecting equation (16) reveals a potential negative relationship between the productivity of multinationals
that self-select into a host country and the idiosyncratic demand shock (aij) captured in the error term. This
is because rms with high productivity may invest in a foreign country even with relatively low draws of aij
whereas low-productivity rms will need su¢ ciently high draws of aij to enter the same country. This negative
correlation has been noted by Crozet et al. (2009) for the case of export decision and can lead to a downward bias
to the parameter of i when estimating the level of sales. While we do not perform a¢ liate sales estimation (at
rm-country level), we address the general concern of potential correlation between productivity and error term in
Section 6.2 using a control-function approach. This approach allows us to recover unobserved rm heterogeneities
and control for them in the estimation of location decision.
25Two strategies have often been used to estimate a xed-e¤ect binary choice model. One can either include
a vector of dummy variables in the estimation or use a conditional-logit model. The former may give rise to
the incidential parameter problem that exists in Maximum Likelihood Estimators, but the associated bias is
relatively small when the number of observations per group is su¢ ciently large (Greene, 2009) as is the case here.
We considered both estimators in the paper and found the results were largely similar. The estimates presented
here are obtained from the conditional-logit model. Note because of the nature of conditional-logit model,
including a country xed e¤ect in the analysis drops out all the host countries where no French multinationals
are present and reduces the sample size.
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that impose a higher tari¤ on French exports. They also tend to prefer countries where the
tari¤ of selling back to France is relatively low.
One result not predicted analytically is the positive correlation between the host-country
corporate tax rate and multinationalsincentive to invest in a foreign country. This may reect
the possibility that the maximum o¢ cial tax rate used in the paper is not the rate actually
applied to foreign rms. Unfortunately, these applied tax rates are not available on a systematic
basis and would substantially reduce the sample size.
Now we explore how the e¤ect of TFP can vary across host countries. We rst interact rm
TFP with a vector of host-country dummies as in equation (18) and estimate both j and j .
As in Section 2.3, suppose we can rank countries j = 1; :::; N based on their cuto¤ productivities
such that country 1 is the easiest market of all and country N is the most di¢ cult. This would
suggest that 1 > 2 > ::: > N 1 > N . If the e¤ect of TFP diminishes in market attractiveness,
we should then have 1 < 2 < ::: < N 1 < N . As shown in Figure 4, we observe a clear
negative correlation between estimated country attractiveness, i.e., bj , and the e¤ect of TFP,
i.e., bj . In fact, the negative relationship is signicant at 1 percent level. This suggests that
the e¤ect of TFP in raising rmsability to invest abroad is stronger in less attractive markets,
i.e., markets with smaller bj . In countries such as Germany, UK, Spain, Belgium, US and China
where the estimated attractiveness is relatively high, the e¤ect of TFP is relatively small.
[Figure 4 about here]
The above nding leads us to examine next how the e¤ect of TFP varies with specic host-
country attributes, i.e., how does rm productivity lead to di¤erential e¤ect of host-country
attributes across individual rms? We proceed by interacting TFP with host-country char-
acteristics, i.e., replacing ji in equation (18) with i + eXj  i where Xj is the vector of
host-country characteristics. As shown in Table 5, we nd the impact of country characteristics
varies systematically across individual rms.26 Specically, while a smaller market potential on
average reduces multinationalsincentives to invest in a foreign country, its e¤ect is smaller for
rms with greater productivities. Based on estimates reported in column (1), for an average-
productivity multinational rm the probability of investing in a foreign country is 0.8 percentage
points lower when the countrys market potential is 50 percent smaller than the average. This
e¤ect decreases to 0.3 percentage points for multinationals whose TFP is 100 percent greater
than the average and 0.2 for rms in the top 90th percentile of productivity distribution. Firms
26Note, as pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003), interpreting the parameters of the interaction terms requires
additional attention when a nonlinear model is used. We followed the procedure described in Ai and Norton (2003)
and computed the marginal e¤ect for rms that belong to di¤erent percentiles of the productivity distribution.
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in the bottom 10th percentile are a¤ected most: a 50-percent decrease in market potential re-
duces these rmsprobability to invest by 1.7 percentage points. This implies that more e¢ cient
rms are more likely than their less e¢ cient competitors to enter countries with a small market
demand.
[Table 5 about here]
The e¤ect of our various measures of xed costs is also asymmetric across rms. While
rms on average are less likely to invest in a country with high entry costs, its adverse e¤ect
is signicantly smaller for more productive rms. Similarly, the e¤ect of distance diminishes
in productivity. Compared to an average-productivity rm whose probability of investing in a
foreign country decreases by 0.3 percentage points when host-country distance increases by 100
percent, MNCs with twice the average TFP will only see a decrease of 0.1 percentage points.
The above e¤ect falls below 0.1 for rms in the top 90th percentile of productivity distribution
but amounts to 0.5 percentage points for the least productive (i.e., 10th percentile) group.
The role of host-country tari¤s in prompting rms to invest in a foreign country also varies
with the productivity level. More productive rms are more likely than their less e¢ cient rivals
to invest in the foreign country with low tari¤s. While the likelihood of an average-productivity
MNC investing in a foreign country is 0.1 percentage points lower when tari¤ falls by 50 percent,
it has little impact on MNCs with twice the TFP (and those in the top 90th percentile). For
rms whose productivity belongs to the 10th percentile, however, it can decrease the investment
probability by 0.2 percentage points. The intuition behind this result is that a lower tari¤ raises
the expected export prot and only rms with a relatively high productivity will still nd it
more protable to invest than to export. French sectoral tari¤s also exert an asymmetric e¤ect
on rms incentive to invest abroad. More productive French rms are less likely to invest
abroad when the cost of exporting products back to France is high.27 The above results remain
largely robust when we include a country xed e¤ect and control for all country specic factors.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we address the potential concern of unobserved heterogeneities and reverse causal-
ity. This is important given the main goal of this paper is to establish the causal e¤ect of TFP
on rmslocation choice.
27This result is not part of our hypotheses as we did not endogenize the mode of supplying home country and
suggests a possible extension of the analysis that is worth exploring.
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6.1 New entries of multinational rms
We previously used rms lagged productivity  estimated based on their home production
activities  to explain current subsidiary locations. However, some subsidiaries may have
existed before or when the TFP was observed and therefore have a spillover e¤ect on rms
performance at home. We modify our dataset in this subsection to mitigate the possibility of
reverse causality between TFP and rmslocation choice. Specically, we modify the dataset
such that the set of countries available for each individual rm to set up subsidiaries includes
only those where this rm has not invested before 2001 (the latest year the TFP was observed).
Thus, the analysis here is focused on MNCsdecision to enter a host country market between
2001 and 2005.28
The estimation results are largely similar to Table 5.29 The e¤ect of TFP in stimulating
MNC entry is stronger in countries with less attractive attributes. More productive rms are
signicantly more likely than their rivals to set up new subsidiaries in countries with a small
market potential. They are also more likely to enter countries that require a large entry cost,
are geographically distant from France, and have poor governance, all of which may lead to a
large xed cost of investment. Furthermore, countries that set relatively low tari¤s also attract
the entry of rms with higher TFP.
6.2 Endogeneity of TFP
The concern noted above about a possible correlation between TFP and rmspast investment
activities can be generalized to a broader econometric issue, that is, the endogeneity of rm
productivity. TFP is endogenous when it is correlated with the residuals of the equation,
which may include either past investment activities or other unobserved rm attributes such as
business networks, credit constraints or political assets. We use two approaches to address this
potential concern.
First, we control for all rm characteristics with a rm xed e¤ect. This does not lead to
signicant changes in the results. More productive rms are still signicantly more likely than
their less e¢ cient competitors to invest in countries with a relatively small market potential, a
great xed cost of investment and a low tari¤.
Next we employ a control function approach to further address the potential endogeneity of
TFP. This control function method is developed by Petrin and Train (2005, 2006) to control for
28We also considered an alternative modication in which we constrain the sample to include only new MNCs,
i.e., rms that started investing abroad after 2001. This modication, while signicantly reducing the sample size,
further mitigates the possibility of reverse causality as the included rms did not have any investment activities
until after 2001. The results were largely similar to what is reported here.
29The results are suppressed in the paper and available upon request from the authors.
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unobserved factors in di¤erentiated products models and correct for the endogeneity of prices.
They exploit the information contained in the endogenous variable (e.g., prices) to recover
unobserved variables, which are then used to form controls in the main estimation equation to
condition out the dependence of the endogenous variable on the error term.30 This approach
has recently been adopted by Liu et al. (forthcoming) who use the average wage rate of state-
owned enterprises as an instrumental variable to address the potential endogeneity of regional
wage and its e¤ect on MNCslocation choice in China.
Formally, our objective is to deal with the bias that exists in the following equation:
Pr (yij = 1) =  (+ j + ji + j#i + "ij) ; (19)
where #i represents an unobserved rm variable that is correlated with rm productivity (i)
and, similar to productivity, can a¤ect rms location decision. We proceed in two stages.
First, we derive an estimate of #i based on
b#i = i   E(ijZi); (20)
where Zi is the instrument vector we use to estimate rm productivity.
Plausible instruments in this case include the average productivity of French rms in the same
industry, same region or both. The motivation for using these instruments comes from the large
economics literature on technology spillover, including the recent studies by Jovorcik (2004),
Haskel et al. (2007), and Keller and Yeaple (forthcoming).31 It is also related to studies on
social interaction, such as the recent work by Guiso and Schivardi (2007) who nd strong evidence
of social interaction in rmsstructural adjustment especially for rms in the same industry and
geographic district. In light of these ndings, we construct two reference groups for each French
rm in the sample: (i) rms located in the same region (département) of France;32 (ii) rms
from the same SIC 4-digit industry and same region. Note our TFP measure has already been
deated by the (SIC 4-digit) industry average. We construct the two reference groups using
all French manufacturing rms available from the AMADEUS database (excluding the rm
of interest), which include both multinational and national rms.33 If there exists (positive)
30Note that the control function approach leads to the usual IV estimator in standard linear models, but o¤ers
distinct advantages relative to the IV estimator in nonlinear models.
31The majority of the above studies focus on the technology spillovers from foreign MNCs to domestic rms.
For our purpose here, we consider all the rms producing in France as a potential source of spillover without
distinguishing the structure of their ownership.
32We consider rms from the same département as one geographic group. Départements, analogous to English
counties, are administrative units of France and many former French colonies. Our sample consists of rms from
totally 92 départements.
33 In the construction of the instrumental variables, rms that are the only observation in their industry and
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regional spillover, the productivity of an individual rm should be (positively) correlated with
the productivity of its reference group (i). When there is also an intra-industry spillover (due
to, for example, technology transfer), the productivity correlation should be strongest for rms
that are in not only the same region but also the same industry (group (ii)).34
Based on the rst stage, we obtain an estimate of #i, i.e., b#i. This estimate is then included
in the second stage to proxy for unobserved rm heterogeneities that are correlated with TFP.
In doing so, we mitigate the potential correlation between "ij and ji. Formally, we estimate
the following equation:
Pr (yij = 1) = 

+ j + ji + j b#i + "ij ; (21)
where b#i is interacted with either a vector of host-country dummies or host-country attributes,
i.e., Xj .
[Table 6 about here]
We nd in the rst stage that rm productivity is signicantly and positively correlated with
the average productivity of its peers in the same region. This correlation is particularly strong
for peers in the same industry, even when we control for region xed e¤ect. In the second stage,
correcting for the endogeneity does not change our estimates signicantly. When we interact
TFP (and b#i) with a vector of host-country dummies and estimate equation (21), we nd again
a negative correlation between the e¤ect of TFP, i.e., bj , and the estimated attractiveness of
the market, i.e., bj , as in Section 5. In fact, the correlation becomes stronger after we control
for the e¤ect of unobserved rm heterogeneities. The above result is also supported in Table
6 where we interact TFP (and b#i) with host-country characteristics.35 Our previous ndings
that more productive rms are more likely to invest in countries with a small market potential,
a high xed cost of investment, and a low tari¤ remain largely robust.
6.3 Unobserved host-country attributes
So far we have used country dummies in some of our estimations to control for host-country at-
tributes. The issue of unobserved host-country attributes can still arise, however. For example,
region were dropped because of the lack of reference group (ii). This reduces the number of rms included in
the sample. We also considered excluding multinational rms in the formation of reference groups. The results
remain largely similar.
34We also considered including rm age as an additional instrumental variable and found the results remain
largely similar.
35Because the estimation consists of tted values obtained from an earlier stage, we use bootstrapping to correct
the standard errors.
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host countriessectoral market structure is likely to exert a signicant e¤ect on multinationals
location decision and this e¤ect is likely to vary across rms. But data on sectoral market
structure is often missing and di¢ cult to obtain for all host countries. To address this issue,
we adopt a two-step procedure to construct an industry specic measure of host-market attrac-
tiveness. This approach is inspired by Head and Mayer (2004) and Head and Ries (2008),
who estimate a trade and FDI equation, respectively, with origin and destination xed e¤ects
and construct a measure of destination-market attractiveness to control for unobserved country
characteristics.
The procedure proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate an FDI equation where the depen-
dent variable is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if there is at least one multinational rm
from country h and industry k investing in country j.36 Specically, we consider the following
equation:
Yhjk = hk + jk + hjk + "hjk; (22)
where hjk  1 ln dhj + 2Bhj . In the above equation, hk represents the home country-
industry xed e¤ect, jk represents a vector of host country-industry dummies, and hjk is a
vector of bilateral market access variables including distance (dhj) and contiguity (Bhj). The
dataset we use to estimate equation (22) is obtained from AMADEUS and includes the original
EU 15 members as home countries and 127 EU and non-EU countries as host countries. One of
the motives to consider EU members as home countries is the uniform trade policy they set on
foreign countries and the uniform treatment they receive. This means that jk will capture not
only host-country specic attributes, such as market size, production cost and market structure,
but also bilateral trade policy variables that do not vary across EU, such as host-country tari¤s
on EU members and EUs external tari¤s on a foreign country.
[Table 7 about here]
In the second step, we use the estimates of jk obtained from the rst step, i.e., bjk, as an
industry specic measure of host-market attractiveness, to estimate individual French MNCs
location decisions. As shown in Table 7, the parameters of bjk and bjk  i are both signicant.
French rms are more likely to invest in countries with a greater (estimated) attractiveness.
But this e¤ect is signicantly smaller for more productive rms, as indicated by the negative
parameter of bjk  i. This again implies that rms with a higher productivity have a greater
probability to enter tough markets.
36We also considered the number of multinationals and the total volume of a¢ liate sales (from country h,
industry k and investing in country j) as alternative dependent variables and found the results qualitatively
similar.
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7 Conclusion
Foreign direct investment and rm heterogeneity are two prominent research areas that have
attracted a substantial amount of attention from both economists and policy makers. We
contribute to these strands of literature by examining the interplay of country asymmetry and
rm heterogeneity in determining multinationalslocation decisions how rmsdi¤erences in
productivity can lead to distinct choices of foreign production locations.
We nd, at both the aggregate- and rm-level, that there is a systematic relationship between
rm productivity and selection of foreign production location. The aggregate-level evidence in-
dicates that the productivity of French MNCs varies signicantly across host countries. Markets
with less attractive attributes, including a relatively small market potential, a high unit labor
cost, a large xed cost of investment and a low import tari¤, tend to have higher cuto¤ pro-
ductivities and attract a greater proportion of productive multinationals. Furthermore, the
productivity distribution of rms that invest in these countries rst-order stochastically domi-
nates those that invest in easy markets.
These ndings are also supported by the rm-level evidence. We nd that rmschoice of
host countries varies signicantly with their total factor productivity. More productive rms
are signicantly more likely to invest in countries with a small market potential, high entry
barriers and large xed costs of investment. The probability of investing in countries that set
relatively low tari¤s is also higher for these rms.
To establish the causal e¤ect of TFP, we perform a number of sensitivity analyses. First,
we seek to mitigate the concern of reverse causality by limiting the analysis to new entries
of multinationals. Second, we address the potential endogeneity of rm productivity using
a control function approach. In this approach, we pair each French multinational rm with
respective reference groups, formed by other French national and multinational rms in the
same region and the same industry, and use the average productivity of the reference groups
as instruments. The causal e¤ect of productivity on multinationalslocation decision remains
largely robust rms with varied productivity are systematically sorted into di¤erent types of
host markets. Finally, we construct an industry-specic measure of host-country attractiveness
to control for unobserved country attributes. We nd the results are qualitatively similar.
These ndings convey an important message to host-country policy makers: Changes in
investment or trade policies will a¤ect not only the volume of foreign direct investment but also
the productivity distribution of multinational rms that decide to enter the host country. For
example, an increase in tari¤s may in fact stimulate FDI but does so by increasing the entry of
less productive rms. To the extent that there might be domestic productivity spillovers from
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foreign MNCs, it is crucial to be aware that the productivity composition of multinationals is not
homogeneous and there can be decreasing returns to using trade policy as means of attracting
multinational rms.
While this paper focuses on exploring the role of rm heterogeneity in multinationalslocation
decision, it can be extended in two main directions. First, like the majority of the literature, this
paper has assumed that a rms decision to invest in one location is independent of their locations
in third countries. This assumption is increasingly challenged by real world observations as more
multinational rms adopt complex integration strategies. For example, many rms today engage
in export-platform FDI, in which case the decision to invest in a foreign country does not only
depend on the costs of exporting to that country from multinationalshome but also the costs
of exporting from subsidiaries abroad. Blonigen et al. (2007) and Baltagi et al. (2007), who
investigate third-country e¤ects in the pattern of U.S. outward FDI, are two leading studies in
this area. However, rm-level evidence obtained with detailed information on individual MNCs
subsidiary network is still largely missing.
Second, most analyses in this area have treated multinationalslocation decision as static,
despite the fact that rms often adjust their location choices by expanding in new markets and
contracting in less attractive locations. While this paper has examined the entry of multina-
tional rms into new host countries (in Section 6.1) as an attempt to disentangle the causality
between productivity and location choice, the relationship between rm productivity and loca-
tion adjustments is a question that can be further explored with the facilitation of additional
time series data.
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Figure 1: The relationship between host-country popularity and minimum TFP (with lowess
smoother)
Figure 2: Host-country market potential and MNC productivity distribution
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Figure 3: Host-country entry cost and MNC productivity distribution
Figure 4: The relationship between the estimated e¤ect of TFP and country attractiveness
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Source Mean Std. dev. Min Max
location AMADEUS 0.02 0.14 0 1
market potential WDI, CEPII 22.6 0.56 21.7 24.2
unit labor cost World Bank 0.15 0.07 0.002 0.52
labor intensity AMADEUS 0.66 0.19 0 0.99
corporate tax O¢ ce of Tax Policy Research -1.21 0.27 -2.41 -0.61
entry cost WDI 3.35 1.52 0 7.16
distance CEPII 8.29 0.93 5.57 9.85
contiguity  0.04 0.20 0 1
EU  0.17 0.37 0 1
governance POLITY 0.13 0.99 -2.16 2.28
host-country tari¤ COMTRADE 1.77 1.26 0 5.56
home-country tari¤ COMTRADE 0.50 0.78 0 3.71
Note: All variables except location, contiguity, and EU are in natural logs.
Table 2: Minimum and average TFP
Dependent variable H0 min TFP ave TFP
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
market potential  -0.06*** (0.02) -0.04** (0.02)
unit labor cost + 0.62** (0.33) 0.53** (0.27)
corporate tax + 0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04)
entry cost + 0.05*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
distance +/ 0.07*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
contiguity +/ -0.36*** (0.04) -0.14*** (0.02)
EU +/ 0.13*** (0.04) 0.08* (0.04)
governance  -0.02 (0.02) -0.04* (0.02)
host-country tari¤  -0.02* (0.01) -0.02* (0.01)
home-country tari¤ + -0.002 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
industry xed e¤ect yes yes
No. of observations 1,724 1,724
R square 0.50 0.74
Prob>F 0.00 0.00
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii)
***, **, and * respectively represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%;
(iii) GLS estimates are reported for ave TFP.
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Table 3: Firm-level decisions
Dependent variable H0 ave a¢ liate sales num of countries
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
TFP + 2.62*** (0.19) 3.26*** (0.57)
No. of observations 1,302 1,302
R square 0.18 0.10
Prob>F 0.00 0.00
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***,
**, and * respectively represent signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%; (iii)
OLS estimates are reported.
Table 4: E¤ect of TFP and host-country attributes on subsidiary locations
Dep. variable: location H0 (1) (2)
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
TFP + 1.07*** (0.14) 1.15*** (0.08)
market potential + 0.46*** (0.04)
unit labor cost  -6.09*** (1.24)
labor intensity + 0.52 (0.41) 0.61* (0.37)
unit labor cost  labor intensity  -2.01 (1.90) -2.53 (2.63)
corporate tax  0.25*** (0.09)
entry cost  -0.43*** (0.02)
distance +/ -0.42*** (0.04)
contiguity +/ 2.06*** (0.06)
EU +/ -0.85*** (0.09)
governance + 0.47*** (0.03)
host-country tari¤ + 0.08*** (0.02) -0.13 (0.10)
home-country tari¤  -0.15** (0.06) -0.07 (0.07)
country xed e¤ect no yes
No. of observations 85,328 79,236
Log pseudo-likelihood -11,576.4 -10,423.3
Pseudo R square 0.17 0.22
Notes: (i) standard errors are clustered at rm level and reported in the
parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signicance at 1%,
5%, and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported.
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Table 5: Asymmetric e¤ect of TFP and host-country attributes on locations
Dep. variable: location H0 (1) (2)
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
TFP + 1.06 (2.18) 2.61 (2.66)
market potential + 0.54*** (0.07)
unit labor cost  -5.50*** (1.85)
labor intensity + 0.85** (0.46) 0.90** (0.48)
unit labor cost  labor intensity  -3.98** (2.21) -4.18* (2.37)
corporate tax  0.35*** (0.15)
entry cost  -0.52*** (0.03)
distance  -0.63*** (0.06)
contiguity + 2.30*** (0.11)
EU +/ -0.81*** (0.13)
governance + 0.47*** (0.05)
host-country tari¤ + 0.19*** (0.04) -0.02 (0.06)
home-country tari¤  0.04 (0.08) 0.14 (0.09)
TFP
market potential  -0.12* (0.07) -0.15* (0.09)
unit labor cost + 0.74 (0.83) 0.26 (0.93)
corporate tax + -0.15 (0.15) -0.05 (0.14)
entry cost + 0.13*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.04)
distance + 0.33*** (0.06) 0.27*** (0.07)
contiguity  -0.40*** (0.15) -0.48*** (0.16)
EU +/ -0.05 (0.15) -0.21 (0.18)
governance  0.00 (0.05) 0.06 (0.08)
host-country tari¤  -0.16*** (0.04) -0.16*** (0.04)
home-country tari¤ -0.28*** (0.12) -0.35*** (0.14)
country xed e¤ect no yes
No. of observations 85,328 79,236
Log pseudo-likelihood -11,511.8 -10,513.5
Pseudo R square 0.17 0.23
Notes: (i) standard errors are clustered at rm level and reported in the
parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signicance at 1%,
5%, and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported.
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Table 6: Endogeneity of TFP: control function approach (stage 2)
stage 2: location H0 (1) (2)
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
TFP
market potential  -0.06* (0.03) -0.28** (0.15)
unit labor cost + 3.26 (3.64) 1.05 (1.06)
corporate tax + 0.32 (0.69) -0.05 (0.28)
entry cost + 0.48*** (0.19) 0.10 (0.08)
distance + 0.54** (0.27) 0.39*** (0.11)
contiguity  -1.07*** (0.45) -0.19 (0.18)
EU +/ 0.52 (0.67) 0.26 (0.27)
governance  -0.21 (0.30) 0.11 (0.13)
host-country tari¤  -0.49*** (0.17) -0.23*** (0.06)
home-country tari¤ -0.53* (0.30) -0.37*** (0.12)
^iXij yes yes
rm xed e¤ect yes yes
No. of observations 79,933 79,933
Log pseudo-likelihood -7,487.3 -7,486.3
Pseudo R square 0.22 0.22
Notes: (i) standard errors are clustered at rm level and reported in the
parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signicance at 1%,
5% and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported.
Table 7: Unobserved country sectoral characteristics
Dep. variable: H0 location entry
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
TFP 1.18*** (0.09) 1.05*** (0.09)
estimated attractiveness 0.14*** (0.03) 0.14*** (0.02)
distance 
contiguity 
TFP
estimated attractiveness  -0.08*** (0.03) -0.14*** (0.04)
distance + 0.002** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
contiguity  -0.04*** (0.01) -0.13*** (0.04)
country xed e¤ect yes yes
No. of observations 114,600 109,153
Log pseudo-likelihood -11,273.5 -9,825.3
Pseudo R square 0.05 0.05
Notes: (i) standard errors are clustered at rm level and reported in the
parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * respectively represent signicance at 1%,
5% and 10%; (iii) Logit estimates are reported.
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